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Conceptualising Remote Warfare: The 
Past, Present, and Future 




On 28 February and 1 March 2019 the Remote Warfare Programme and the authors 
held a two-day conference on remote warfare. We had three goals when organising 
this event: 
• to provide a forum for a more holistic study of remote warfare; 
• to promote greater dialogue between different stakeholder communities working in or 
researching remote warfare; 
• and to encourage reflection on the recent debates on remote warfare. 
Our goal was to lay the groundwork for a richer understanding of the past, present, 
and future of remote warfare to help better inform academics and practitioners. 
This essay captures the beginning of this conversation. It addresses the three major 
questions asked in our call for papers: 
• What is remote warfare? 
• What are the historical roots of remote warfare? 
• What is the future of remote warfare?[1] 
Our analysis is selective, and we do not offer an exhaustive summary of the entire 
conference. Podcasts are available on most of the panels, and we did not wish to 
reproduce information which is available for you to listen to elsewhere.[2] To this end, 
this essay also aims to stimulate the development of remote warfare scholarship by 
identifying gaps within the conference proceedings. Some potential areas for future 
research are listed in the conclusion. 
 
What is Remote Warfare? 
Our conference was organised around existing debates that speak to a perceived shift 
in the character of warfare in the twenty-first century. According to some, there is “a 
deep and widespread feeling that war has entered a new era, significantly different 
from what we have known in the past”.[3] In defining this shift, scholars have entered 
into what Jolle Demmers and Lauren Gould have labelled “something of a coining 
contest” as they grapple with “the spatial and temporal reconfiguration of war” in the 
contemporary era.[4] Remote warfare forms part of this larger debate, although its 
exact relationship to liquid warfare,[5] proxy warfare,[6] surrogate warfare,[7] and 
vicarious warfare[8] remains unclear. 
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As it relates to some of the specific practices of remote warfare, drone warfare was a 
major theme of our conference.[9] Serious questions remain regarding the purported 
precision of drone strikes, at least as it relates to civilian causalities.[10] These, in turn, 
have generated legal and humanitarian concerns.[11] When coupled with the use of 
other remote warfare practices, drones have contributed toward what some see as the 
“myth” that “it is possible to do remote warfare cleanly”.[12] 
The discussion of drones was also related to a broader discussion about the of the 
“intimacies” of remote warfare which was another major theme of our 
conference.[13] Several studies have examined the perspectives of drone operators, 
including conference participant Alex Holder.[14]Peter Lee, who embedded with UK 
drone pilots as part of his research, has written in detail about the “distance paradox” 
which drone operators face. The very same technology which allows MQ-9 Reaper 
pilots to fly the craft from thousands of miles away has also compressed the emotional 
and psychological distance between drone operators and their targets to a level 
comparable to World War One fighter pilots.[15] The psychological challenges 
experienced by drone operators have also been previously studied by Joseph Chapa, 
who argued that they have generated new forms of military sacrifice and ethics.[16] 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, as warfare has become more “intimate” for some, 
it has become increasingly distant for others. This seems to be as true for drones as 
other types of warfare. Malte Riemann has previously argued that the use of private 
military security contractors has reshaped modes of remembrance, duty, and sacrifice, 
thereby making war appear less visible within democratic societies.[17] The study of 
remote warfare therefore raises important questions about who pays the costs of 
warfare in democratic societies, and what this means for the accountability and 
oversight of the use of military force.[18] Likewise, as Yvonni Efstathiou of the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies explored, it also raises the question of 
whether there is a relationship between regime type and the use and non-use of 
remote warfare.[19] 
In fact, one major theme of our conference was the use of other practices of military 
intervention which, like drones, have enabled Western states to manage security 
challenges overseas from a greater strategic distance. As Foeke Postma of Pax for 
Peace noted in his post-conference summary, “[d]rones are used in concert with 
special forces, private military corporations, local armed groups, the transfer of arms, 
the sharing of intelligence, and other forms of security assistance”.[20] This broadened 
focus on the practices of remote warfare is not new, and does not mean that the debate 
on drones is now redundant. From the term’s recent inception, the practices of remote 
warfare were recognised to consist of more than drones.[21] 
Many at the conference emphasised the importance of including building partner 
capacity operations in this debate, including Martijn van der Vorm and Ivor Wiltenburg 
of the Netherlands Defence Academy, CIVIC's Dan Mahanty, and the Oxford 
Research Group's Emily Knowles and Abigail Watson. According to Mahanty, 
partnered operations have “come to represent the preferred method of achieving 
national security objectives for the United States and several European 
countries”.[22] Similarly, van der Vorm and Wiltenburg argued that “[w]hen large scale 
deployments are practically unfeasible or politically unpalatable, interventions focus 
on assisting local partners with enhancing their security forces in order to help them 
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resolve security issues without large commitments”.[23] Despite the continuing 
uncertainties about the military effectiveness of these practices, many areas in the 
world – such as the Sahel and Horn of Africa – have seen an increase in these partner-
building activities, as multiple conference participants discussed.[24] 
Moving forward, one major area of research identified at the conference was the need 
to amplify the voices of the communities in which remote warfare operations are 
conducted. Whilst there are obvious data limitation problems given the difficulties in 
conducting fieldwork in these countries, examining the non-Western experience of 
remote warfare offers the prospect of a more comprehensive analysis of its costs, 
consequences, and effectiveness. As Norma Rossi and Malte Riemann argued, by 
destabilising the temporality and spatiality of war,[25] remote warfare has undermined 
the traditional dichotomy between war and peace. One effect of this has been to create 
“privileged spaces of exception” in Western states where the conditions of war are 
absent.[26] Yet, whilst remote warfare may be “remote” in some aspects from a 
Western perspective, it is “immediate” and “ever present” for some communities in 
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.[27]   
During the conference, Baraa Shiban and Camilla Molyneux helped bring these 
currently marginalised voices into clearer focus. Drawing on fieldwork in Yemen, they 
demonstrated that the harm generated by remote warfare operations must be 
measured in more than just civilian casualties. These operations also have significant 
economic, educational, and mental health implications for impacted 
communities.[28] On this theme of non-Western experiences, Anicée Van Engeland 
has also begun to “decolonise” the study of remote warfare by examining how its 
practices are understood in Islam and how they may reinforce perceptions of 
“otherness”.[29]Both of these studies make particularly timely contributions to the 
wider debate on the character and implications of remote warfare. 
 
What are the historical roots of remote warfare? 
The concept of remote warfare is widely used to “periodise” the current slate of global 
conflicts ranging from the Middle East and the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. At the 
conference, it was commonly used as a shorthand to capture the effort by Western 
states – principally the UK and the US – to move away from the counterinsurgency 
(COIN) model associated with recent “large footprint” campaigns in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. As Paul Schulte has previously argued, for a variety of strategic and political 
reasons, Western policymakers pledged “never again (to) big interventionary 
COIN”.[30] 
According to some at the conference, contemporary practices of remote warfare have 
their roots in the military campaigns fought by the United States and Soviet Union 
during the Cold War. Emil Archambault, for example, examined the use of strategic 
and tactical air power during the Vietnam War as a key moment in the history of remote 
warfare.[31] During the Cold War, the superpowers regularly engaged one another via 
locally trained and equipped forces partly to reduce the risk of direct 
confrontation.[32] Some analysts go back further; John Alexander, for instance, traces 
the modern origins of remote warfare to the British use of airpower during the inter-
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war period. It could be argued that the concept has origins in imperial policing 
operations.[33] 
Some of the practices of remote warfare – intelligence sharing, private military 
contractors, security cooperation, special forces – have roots in the twentieth century 
(if not before). It will not be difficult for scholars to find historical case studies to 
document this.[34] Others, such as drones and cyber, are more novel and are the 
result of more recent technological developments. Can this tension be reconciled, or 
is the history of remote warfare best studied as a response to the failure of large-scale 
overseas intervention? 
In this respect, it remains unclear how far back we should trace the historical roots of 
remote warfare beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. It could be, to paraphrase Hew 
Strachan, that we have generally treated remote warfare as being “‘new’ because in 
part we have not been addressing [it] properly”.[35] As he reminds us: 
  
The challenge for the historian is much harder than the identification of 
continuity. That is the easy bit. The next stage is to use that as the bedrock from 
which to identify what is really new, as opposed to what merely seems to be 
new, to distinguish the revolutionary and evolutionary from the evanescent and 
ephemeral.[36] 
In his keynote address to our conference, Strachan grounded contemporary practices 
associated with the “remote warfare” label in a much longer historical trajectory. 
Without discounting recent political and technological changes, he suggested that the 
dynamics linking strategy to domestic factors can be traced to the time of Clausewitz, 
if not before. In a contemporary setting, the strategic “distance” of more limited forms 
of war must be seen in light of democratic considerations “at home”.[37] 
 
What is the future of remote warfare? 
As conference participants repeatedly stressed, for the immediate future, remote 
warfare is here to stay. Notwithstanding a major unforeseen security catastrophe, and 
despite the Trump administration’s renewed emphasis on Great Power rivalry, it is 
unlikely that Western states will resume large-scale COIN campaigns in the immediate 
future. 
In the longer term, the potential development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) 
could change the fundamental character of warfare itself. An autonomous weapon can 
be broadly defined as “a machine, whether hardware or software, that, once activated, 
performs some task or function on its own”.[38] The development of autonomous 
weapons have formed a central component of the Third Offset Strategy in the United 
States which aims to leverage advances in artificial intelligence to offset vulnerabilities 
elsewhere.[39] Whilst the Ministry of Defence has insisted that “[t]he UK does not 
possess fully autonomous weapon systems and has no intention of developing 
them”[40], the UK is investing (if on a much smaller scale and for different reasons) in 
similar technologies. Robert Clark described how, as part of Exercise Autonomous 
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Warrior 2018, a British Army Battlegroup conducted four weeks of combat trails and 
testing with unmanned ground systems on Salisbury Plain.[41] Whilst barriers may still 
remain to their integration into British Armed Forces, autonomy is likely to become an 
increasingly important part of combat operations, surveillance, and logistics in the 
future.[42] 
The development of such systems is the subject of considerable controversy. Multiple 
civil society groups, leading scientists, and some states have called for a pre-emptive 
ban on such weapons due to ethical and legal considerations.[43] According to Ingvild 
Bode and Hendrik Huelss, the development of weapon systems with autonomy in their 
critical functions may create novel logics of appropriateness which challenge the 
existing norms governing the use of force.[44]Furthermore, as Bode discussed at the 
conference, the potential development of weapon systems with autonomy in their 
critical functions raises questions about the issue of meaningful human control in 
technologically-mediated forms of remote warfare.[45] 
Others, however, are more optimistic. Used under the right conditions such systems 
have potentially “virtuous” uses.[46] Larry Lewis, director of the Centre for Autonomy 
and Artificial Intelligence, argued that the proper use of machine learning algorithms 
can help minimise civilian casualties during armed conflict.[47] As he has previously 
argued: 
  
AI could review imagery and other intelligence to reduce the number of civilians 
mistakenly identified as combatants. They could monitor areas and provide a 
double check of existing collateral damage estimates, particularly as things can 
change over time. AI-driven unmanned systems would allow those systems to 
take on risk and use tactical patience, which can reduce risk to civilians.[48] 
  
Given the uncertain trajectory concerning the development of autonomous functions, 




Our conference aimed to lay the groundwork for a richer understanding of the past, 
present, and future of remote warfare to better inform academics and policymakers. 
In order to help further develop the study of remote warfare, we have identified a series 
of potential areas for future research: 
What is remote warfare?  
• Does remote warfare encompass different conceptualisations of the changing 
character of warfare, or is it distinct? What is the relationship between remote warfare 
and the debates on grey-zone warfare, hybrid warfare, liquid warfare, proxy warfare, 
surrogate warfare, and vicarious warfare? 
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• Who are the users of remote warfare? Are these exclusively Western democratic 
states like the UK, the US, and France, or is there a non-Western approach to remote 
warfare? 
• How are remote warfare operations experienced by different communities in Africa, 
the Middle East, and Asia? 
The history of remote warfare: 
• How far should we trace the historical roots of remote warfare beyond the end of the 
counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq? 
• Has remote warfare often been treated as a “new” development because its historical 
roots have not been properly addressed, or does the use of new technological 
practices, such as drones and cyber warfare, make it genuinely novel? 
• How should the historical roots of remote warfare be studied: as a set of practices or 
as a nexus of technological, security, and political developments? 
The future of remote warfare: 
• Is remote warfare here to stay? If so, how should we approach elements of change 
and continuity? 
• What consequences would the development of AWS have for the “remoteness”, 
oversight, and practices of contemporary warfare? 
Given its breadth and complexity, we recognise that the study of remote warfare is 
likely to remain fluid for some time. It will continue to be shaped by shifts in the global 
security landscape and the patchwork of different professional, normative, and 
analytical perspectives of those involved in its study.  
This presents both challenges and opportunities. At times, tensions emerge between 
those focused on the technical and operational dimensions of remote warfare, and 
those seeking to scrutinise its effects on human security and democratic 
accountability. All stakeholders would do well to reflect on their own positions in the 
study of remote warfare. A commitment to open dialogue and analytical reciprocity 
remains essential if remote warfare scholarship is to continue to grow. For some, 
“mentioning theory has long been a sure way to make policy makers’ eyes glaze 
over”[49]. As our conference demonstrated, however, theory can add considerable 
depth to our understanding of the drivers, characteristics, and implications of remote 
warfare. Likewise, the first-hand experiences and perspectives of the military 
personnel conducting remote warfare operations are vital if we are to avoid a circular 
and inaccurate discussion of its practices.[50] 
The intellectual and professional pluralism of remote warfare scholarship represents 
one of its greatest strengths. Participants may face different professional cultures and 
incentive structures, but the inclusion of diverse voices remains crucial if we are to 
realise a more holistic understanding of remote warfare. This briefing represents the 
beginning of this process, not its end, and we hope to organise similar events in the 
future. As remote warfare scholarship continues to develop, our collective commitment 
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